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Contents

• 1. Overview
• 2. Tropical Cyclone Watch
• 3. National Emergency Response Mechanisms and Capabilities
• 4. UN Support to National Authorities
• 5. Air Operations
• 6. UNJLC Haiti Coordinates

1. Overview

A number of tropical cyclones have developed in the immediate vicinity of Haiti, during the current reporting period.

The first 2004 Tropical Depression (TD1) formed off the south-eastern coast of the United States, on 31 July 2004. On 02 August 2004 this depression was upgraded and designated Tropical Storm ALEX, before quickly being upgraded again to Category 2 Hurricane status later that same day. TD2, which eventually became Tropical Storm BONNIE, formed on 03 August 2004, and caused death and flooding as far north as Canada. It was quickly
followed by TD3, on 04 August 2004, whose status was subsequently raised to that of Tropical Storm CHARLEY, on 10 August and to that of Category 2 Hurricane status, on 12 August 2004. On 13 August it was raised to a Category 4 hurricane and hit Florida with devastating effect.

Tropical Storm CHARLEY

The Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Scale is a 1-5 rating based on the hurricane's present intensity. This is used to give an estimate of the potential property damage and flooding expected along the coast from a hurricane landfall. Wind speed is the determining factor in the scale, as storm surge values are highly dependent on the slope of the continental shelf in the landfall region (http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/aboutsshs.shtml ).

The customs strike which began 16 July 2004, as reported in UNJLC Bulletin 02, ended on 30 July 2004 after customs agents and government authorities came to an agreement. Although this has been cause for some measure of disruption to the UN System, IGO and NGO supply chain, mitigating measures raised in Bulletin 02 have been successfully implemented by agencies, thereby limiting the strike’s negative impact on their operations.

This Bulletin will attempt to map out national government disaster risk management structures and capabilities and highlight capacity-building initiatives the UN System has put in place, to improve government disaster response.

2. Tropical Cyclone Watch

31 Jul 04, the first tropical depression (TD1) of the 2004 season formed off the south-eastern coast of the United States and a Tropical Storm Watch was issued. On 02 Aug 04 the National Hurricane Centre (NHC) – Miami issued advisories on Tropical Storm ALEX, which has remained stationary about 100 miles south-southeast of Charleston South Carolina.

Although this system was not expected to affect Haiti, it re-emphasized continued favourable conditions for the development of tropical depressions in the Atlantic, Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico region. At 5 p.m. That same day, Tropical Strom ALEX was upgraded to Hurricane status and warning issued, to targeted US Eastern Coast populations for preparations to be made to protect life and property. Hurricane ALEX continued its way northward over several days before slowly subsiding over the cooler waters of the North Atlantic.

Newly formed TD2 was first reported in the tropical Atlantic, east of the Lesser Antilles, at 11 a.m. on 03 August 2004. As its path was forecasted to pass over the Island of Hispaniola (Haiti and Dominican Republic), UNDP, OCHA and UNJLC conducted a series of tri-lateral coordination meetings and ensured all interested parties were kept abreast of the evolution of the situation.

 The Haiti National Weather Centre issued a Tropical Storm watch, but at 5 p.m., on 04 August 2004, the depression degenerated back to a tropical wave and although regeneration was possible, it was expected to be slow. The National Hurricane Centre – Miami (NOAA/NHC) informed it was discontinuing the issuing of advisories for TD2, unless it was to regenerate. Indeed, at 4 p.m., on 09 August 2004, the NHC reported Tropical Storm BONNIE had formed from the remnants of TD2, in the southern Gulf of Mexico. As forecasts did not indicate the system was expected to return towards Haiti, no more than interested monitoring was made by the UN System.

By 12 August 2004, the system was reported to produce coastal storm surge flooding of 2 to 5 feet above normal tide levels, along with large and dangerous battering waves. An additional rainfall accumulation of 4 to 6 inches (100 – 150mm) was expected and isolated tornadoes were also possible along its path. By that time, however, the centre of Tropical Storm BONNIE was poorly defined and expected to weaken.

Tropical depression Two(TD2)

In the meantime TD3 was in the making. Indeed, at 0530 a.m., on 04 August 2004, a tropical wave and associated area of low pressure was located in the far eastern tropical Atlantic Ocean, a few hundred miles west of Cape Verde islands. On 05 Aug 04 this system was located about 980 miles (approx 1600 km) west of the Cape Verde Islands and moving west-northwest at 15 MPH. At 0630 a.m., on 06 Aug 04, it was reported as a well-defined low pressure system located about 1050 miles east of the northern Leeward Islands and showing signs of organisation as it moved westwards. The morning of 07 Aug 04, the system was reported being at 600 miles of the Leeward islands. On 09 Aug 04, at 0945 a.m., a strong tropical wave located east of Tobago, in the Windward Islands, was reported. Although it had no well-defined surface centre, showers and thunderstorms had become much better organized and surface pressures fallen significantly. Indeed, at 0145 p.m., on 09 Aug 04, the NHC issued a Special Advisory for Tropical Depression 3 (TD3). Preliminary forecast models showed the system passing south of Haiti, onwards towards Jamaica and the Gulf of Mexico. At 0500 a.m. on 10 Aug 04, TD3 had reached tropical storm winds and was designated Tropical Storm CHARLEY. By that time, the centre of CHARLEY was located approximately 450 miles south of Santo Domingo and later that day, a storm watch issued by the Haiti National Weather Centre. On 11 Aug 04, the warning was lifted, in Haiti, but the weather system kept gaining momentum, until it was declared a hurricane at 0800 a.m., on 12 Aug 04. On writing these lines (morning of 12 Aug 04), hurricane CHARLEY was building strength, heading northwest and expected to pass over the western portion of Cuba, before slightly turning north-northwest, towards the Florida peninsula. CHARLEY was associated with above normal tides accompanied by large and dangerous battering waves. Storm surge flooding of 2 to 4 feet and 6 to 10 feet could respectively be expected in the Florida Keys and along the southwest Florida coast. Rainfall accumulations of 4 to 8 inches (100 – 200 mm) which could cause life-threatening flash floods and mudslides were also expected. On 13 Aug it was upgraded to Cat 4, before hitting Florida.

3. National Emergency Response Mechanisms and Capabilities

The following information is essentially extracted from the Haiti National Intervention Plan, dated December 2001 and herein referred to as the Plan (Unofficially translated by UNJLC Haiti, from a French language document) as well as from the UN System Inter-Agency Preparation and Disaster Response Plan, dated October 2003, prepared by the UNDP Disaster Management and Response Unit.

National Response Structure:

The Haitian National Disaster Response Plan highlights the roles and responsibilities of government and non-government organisations, in response to catastrophes.

The Permanent Secretary for Disaster Risk Management (PSDRM) has the mandate to coordinate and maintain a viable Plan. The PSDRM is, namely, expected to communicate the National Committee for Disaster and Risk Management (NCDRM) the local and departmental operational capability, when required. In turn, the NCDRM will as required, communicate this national operational capability information onwards to the President of Haiti or its duly designated delegate.
In order to ensure articulation of these objectives, the national organisational structure is formed as follows:

The political instability of the past months has effectively rendered non-operational most national disaster response structures, but several initiatives are currently underway to reinforce them. Mr. Michel Matera, UNDP Chief Technical Advisor – Disaster Management is in the process of consolidating subject status information. For more detailed information, he can be reached at michel.matera@undp.org.

Importantly, however, it must be noted that the International Cooperation Assistance Group (ICAG) is responsible for the development of plans touching on (1) International Aid – Coordination of all actions and special problems, with the Ministries and related organisations, regarding international assistance offers and special requirements, and (2) Impact Reduction and Risk Management – Dialogue with Professional Engineering and Scientific international organisations and associations, in order to better evaluate risk and vulnerabilities in the face of threats, such as natural disasters and emergencies.

The Permanent Secretary for Disaster Risk Management (PSDRM) is responsible for the execution of disaster risk management actions requested by the PNGRD. The PSDRM is chaired by the Ministry of Interior and Territorial Collectivities – Director General and has representation from the following Ministries and Organisations : Min. of Health and Populations, Min. of Public Works, Transport and Communications, Min. of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Rural Development, Min. of Environment, Min. of Planning and External Cooperation, Min. of Foreign Affairs and Cults, Min. of Justice and Public Security (Haiti National Police), Min. of Education, Youth and Sports, Min. of Economy and Finance and the Haitian Red Cross.
Various organisations and committees directly assist the PSDRM: Civil Protection; Sectoral and Thematic Group; Departmental, Municipal and Local Committees.

The Civil Protection (DPC – Direction de la protection civile) reports to the Min.of Interior and Territorial Collectivities and coordinate the PSDRM. In this role, Civil Protection coordinates the activities of various ministries, committees and organisations, before, during and after a disaster or emergency. Civil Protection serves as main intervention and reconstruction activity coordinator following a natural disaster.

One of the main component of the Plan, has for objective to create and reinforce Departmental, Municipal and Local Committees. These Committees, in cooperation with public authorities (i.e. Mayor, Police, Judiciary) as well as with Departmental, Municipal and Local organisations, must define a specific Risk Plan which will address; Resource availability, Community relations, Management of relief aid and volunteers, impact reduction and risk management. At this point in time, however, only approximately 50 local committees operate effectively and there are important weaknesses at the Departmental level, which prevents effective flow of information between local and national level entities.

National Response Capabilities:

In terms of disaster response, Haiti institutional capacity is limited. Limited by the means at its disposal and which, essentially, are centrally concentrated. Decentralisation, as initiated by the PNGRD is far from complete and sufficient. Meanwhile, the means at the disposal of the Departments are weak, in terms of coordination of response actions et handling of populations affected by natural disasters.

At central level, coordination mechanisms established by the PNGRD, essentially fall on Civil Protection which stands as the only operational coordination structure. The Emergency Operations Centre is not operational and the PSDRM currently has no more than a secondary operational role, due to lack of funding, necessary in order to ensure its permanent and structured work.

Main National Institutional Rescue Capacities
as of August 2004
(Validated with UNSECOORD)

Although it has its weaknesses, the Haitian Red Cross remains one of the better organised operational national institutions. Over the past few years it has benefited from technical support provided by the French and Dutch Red Cross.

Fire brigades report to the police national direction. It is clearly ill equipped, especially considering their first respondent mandate:

-  No operation budget for the past 4 years.
-  No basic or specialized equipments to conduct Search and Rescue (SAR) operations
-  No emulsion products against petroleum product fires
-  7 cities do not have fire trucks
-  Absence office equipment and furniture
-  No specialized training in help-search-rescue

National police has strength of 3000 police officers, often poorly equipped and untrained in natural disaster response.

The Civil Protection point of contact is Ms. Marie Alta Jean-Baptiste, Director a.i., Tel: +509 228-2537, Email: altajeanbaptiste@yahoo.com

4. UN Support to National Authorities

Other than UN agency direct support to government disaster response (see UNJLC Bulletin 01, dated 15 July 2004, http://www.unjlc.org/content/index.phtml/itemId/23697 ) the UN system also has in place two initiatives which help prepare and support the government for disaster response, namely through capacity building. As alluded to in this and previous bulletins, there is the UNDP Disaster Management Unit, but there is also the PAHO-WHO SUMA - Supply Management System.

UNDP Disaster Management:

Following Cyclone George (September 1998), UNDP (http://www.ht.undp.org/risques/) has initiated, in a program essentially targeted towards response, a first cooperation with the Civil Protection and the Ministry of Interior and Territorial Collectivities. Following this initial intervention, UNDP in coordination with its partners, defined a national capacity building program for Risk and Disaster Management (HAI/99/005) which helped create the National Risk and Disaster Management Plan ( Plan National de Gestion des risques et des désastres ), finalised in February 2001.

Since September 2003, UNDP, through Project HAI/03/002, pursues its capacity building activities, both at national and local levels. The expected results include the operationalisation of the Emergency Operations Centre (EOC) and the strengthening of a Risk and Disaster Management Training Unit.
In the specific context of strengthening of national disaster response capacities, a mechanism composed of a strategic level Disaster Management Team (part of which are the UN System Heads of Agencies) and an operational level Technical Disaster Management Committee (part of which are UN agency Emergency focal points) were established. This entity has put in place and Information and Operations Centre (IOC) with a permanent humanitarian information centre function and a temporary emergency coordination centre function.

In the context of the setting up of the IOC, the UN System has also prepared a « Natural Disaster Preparation and Response Guide » holding : (i) the inter-agency contingency plan, (ii) a response plan and (iii) an operations plan. Considering the fact 80% of information required to conduct humanitarian relief operations can be obtained prior to disasters, this guide holds information permitting ready response, in the event of a disaster.
During the recent Mapou and Fonds Verrette floods, the IOC has played a lead role in the conduct of assessments and coordination of the humanitarian response.

Contacts

Arnaud Dupuy, Deputy-Resident Representative - Responsible for the Sustained Environmental Development Unit, arnaud.dupuy@undp.org
Michel Matera, Chief Technical Advisor, michel.matera@undp.org
Rose-Luce Prévot, National Expert, rose-luce.prevot@undp.org
Julia Quillet, Disaster Risk Management Specialist, julia.quillet@undp.org

PAHO-WHO SUMA – Supply Management System:

SUMA (http://www.disaster-info.net/SUMA/ ) is an information management tool, developed by the Pan American Health Organization, through financial support by the Government of the Netherlands and the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO). SUMA is a tool for the management of humanitarian relief supplies, from the time pledges are made by donors, to their entry into the disaster area and their storage and distribution. It helps national authorities to make order of the chaos often caused by uncoordinated humanitarian assistance. It uses simple software to track items from the moment donors commit to sending supplies until they are distributed effectively to the affected population. SUMA can produce reports and keep disaster managers and humanitarian organizations, as well as donors, the media and the beneficiaries informed of exactly what has been received; quickly identifies and classifies all the humanitarian relief aid and assigns priority to the supplies according to the needs of the by the disaster affected population; offers a tool for inventory control on warehousing and for the monitoring of the distribution of emergency supplies from the warehouses or distribution centers up to local level. The system is composed of three levels: SUMA Central, SUMA Field Unit and Stock Management.

SUMA CENTRAL is meant to be used wherever national authorities are managing a disaster or emergency. At this level, the principal duties include: (1) Defining the parameters to be used by the Field Units, such as reception sites, shipment directories, main user identities (2) Creation and set-up of Field Units (3) Integration of information sent by the Field Units (consolidation) (4) Providing consultations and making up reports which serve to aid the decision-making process and promote inter-institutional coordination (5) Maintenance of the system tables (database)

The FIELD UNIT is designed to operate at points of entry or reception sites, such as borders, water or river ports, and large storage centers (centers where supplies arrive during emergencies, such as airports, collection stands, etc.). The main tasks at this level are: (1) Sorting and identification of supplies using priority labels, under the categories; URGENT-IMMEDIATE DISTRIBUTION, LOW PRIORITY DISTRIBUTION and NON-PRIORITY ITEMS (2) Classification of supplies by categories, subcategories and items (3) Selective checks on items (4) Making up various reports on the content of the supplies registered at the Field Units (5) Making delivery receipts for the addressees (6) Consolidating data on diskettes to be sent to the CENTRAL Level. The SUMA Field Unit uses manual registration forms in case of computer breakdown, or in the event that its use is required for gathering data.

The WAREHOUSE MANAGEMENT module is a tool that registers the arrival and the delivery of supplies at the storage centers or warehouses. Along with supplies, warehouses receive a diskette with information coming from the Field Units and/or the Central Level. This allows for internal management, control and coordination with other institutions and organizations that may be working on the emergency. For example, the Red Cross might allocate a donation of medicines to the Ministry of Health, and SUMA enables solid and efficient tracking of such exchanges. The main duties at this level are: (1) Tracking of local inventory (2) Elaboration of stock reports and deliveries by a number of parameters (3) Inventory follow-up of other subordinate warehouses.

The first step in using SUMA is to train local human resources in-country about the organization and management of emergency supplies and the use of the SUMA software to classify, sort out and assign priority levels. When a disaster strikes, these people will be able to install and operate the system at the different sites of supplies management. In cases of major disasters or in places where SUMA is not established, an international team can provide help with the intention to train locals to take over the system management in minimal time.

Those who can be trained include staff from national government entities responsible for emergency coordination, as well as those from public, private, non-governmental and other organizations involved in or related to emergency relief. In addition are members of the international community, such as international NGOs, UN agencies and bilateral agencies.

The SUMA Haiti POC is Mr. Bienvenu Boko, PAHO-WHO SUMA Coordinator, Email: bienboko@hai.ops-oms.org

5. Air Operations

MINUSTAH Air Ops are constantly updating Helicopter Landing Site locations. When these are given to UNJLC, the UNJLC Airfield and Helicopter Landing Zone map (http://www.unjlc.org/content/index.phtml/itemId/19344 )will be updated.

As stated in UNJLC Bulletin 01, the MINUSTAH currently operate 12 helicopters; 2 x MI-8, 3 x PUMA, 4 x UH-1H and 3 x Bell-212. Following are their respective characteristics:

MINUSTAH Aircraft characteristics

Aircraft/Characteristics	MI-8	PUMA	UH-1H Iroquois	Bell-212
Purpose	Pax/Cargo	Pax/Medevac/Cargo	Pax/Medevac/Cargo	Pax/Medevac/Cargo
Range	350 Km (max load) 460 Km (norm load)	550 Km	512 Km	415 Km
Max Speed	240 Kph	263 Kph	204 Kph	223 Kph
Pax capacity	24 pax	20 pax or 6 stretchers	11-14 pax	13 Pax
Cargo capacity	3 MT (Int/Ext)	2 MT (Int/Ext)	1.5MT Int /2 MT Ext	1.2MT Int/2MT Ext
Service Ceiling	4,500 m	4,800 m	4,145 m	4,145 m

6. UNJLC Haiti Coordinates

François Desruisseaux, Chief UNJLC Haiti Tel: +509 550 0142, Email: Francois.Desruisseaux@wfp.org

UNJLC Office is located on the ground floor of the WFP building.

UNJLC:
387, avenue John Brown
Bourdon
Port-au-Prince
Haiti