Bulletin 2 UNJLC Haiti
The aim of the UNJLC bulletins is to provide a concise weekly overview of UNJLC activities and the present logistical situation in Haiti and the Dominican Republic, with marked initial focus on Haiti situation, due to its weaker national disaster response capability. In addition sector/country specific reports will be released regularly in order to provide in-depth coverage of priority areas.
Contents:
- 1. Overview
- 2. Tropical Cyclone Watch
- 3. Customs
- 4. Emergency Stocks
- 5. Air Operations
- 6. Infrastructure
- 7. Civil-Military Coordination
- 8. Logistics Coordination
- 9. Haiti Coordinates
1. Overview
The May 2004 Mapou - Fonds Verrette floods, which resulted in over 1,000 deaths and 1,800 missing, was the result of 27mm of intensive rainfall. On 21 July 2004 the NOAA NWS Weather Service (http://weather.noaa.gov), reported:
"Evaluation of the satellite imagery and model prognosis shows a trajectory a couple of degrees south of the Hispaniola for the bulk of heavy convection. But positive interaction with the upper level trough north of the island is to likely favour organized convection along the southern coast of the island. The SW corner of the Dominican Republic is at high risk of heavy rainfall, with rainfall maxima of 4-6 inches (100-150mm) to likely fall in a period of 2-4 hours. Total rainfall is likely to exceed 250mm over the mountains. Previous reports show mid level winds of 55kts in association with this system, which could favour strong orographical forcing and the previously mentioned organized convection."
This and the tracking of the weather system, which had been initiated by a Haiti National Meteorological Centre Special Advisory, on 20 July 2004, were but two elements which prompted the Haiti UN System and some of its traditional partners - IFRC, MSF and USAID - to meet and coordinate its response initiatives, in the event another natural disaster was to hit the island of Hispaniola.
In the meantime, on 16 July 2004, a customs strike was declared in Haiti. The negative impact of agencies not being able to clear their humanitarian aid consignments was addressed in a collective fashion and solutions quickly proposed, permitting re-establishment of the supply chain.
Following-up on UNJLC Bulletin 01, dated 15 July 2004, this bulletin will further endeavour to map out disaster response mechanisms and capabilities in Haiti, with special emphasis on logistics considerations.
2. Tropical Cyclone Watch
As reported in UNJLC Bulletin 01, the past weeks have seen marked increase in tropical depression development in the North Atlantic, Caribbean Sea and Gulf of Mexico. This trend has continued throughout this reporting period.
In this context, on 20 July 2004 at 1930 hrs, the Haiti National Meteorological Centre (HNMC) issued a Special Warning with Yellow Alert. A powerful tropical wave had been located south of the Dominican Republic and Haiti and was expected to hit the island of Hispaniola within 24-36 hrs.
After reassessment, on 21 July 04, at 0800 hrs, the HNMC raised the alert level to Orange, meaning warning was to be issued to all departments, informing them of the potential for flash flooding, mudslides and strong winds.
Fortunately, on 22 July 04, at 0800 hrs, the HNMC lifted the Special Warning, after the tropical wave had passed Haiti, essentially bringing with it strong winds but shedding little rain, thereby causing nothing more than localised damage.
3. Customs
Procedures:
Customs procedures, in Haiti, require one original set and 12 copies of following documents: Custom Declaration, jointly with certificate of origin, invoice, phyto-sanitarian certificate, Waybill and copy of the "Quitus Fiscal".
For Tax Exemption, a franchise needs to be approved by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Chief of Protocol. Declaration should be prepared in Port au Prince but can be prepared in Cap Haïtien for Cap Haïtien cargo, with a copy of the letter addressed to the MFA.
Estimate duration for cargo custom clearance and cost is approximately of 8 days but clearance should be initiated with copies of the Bill of Lading (B/L) to, at least, request the Franchise to the Head of protocol.
Source: WFP Logistics Capacity Assessment (LCA) - Haiti
Strike:
A customs strike which started in Port-au-Prince, 16 July 2004, has spread throughout the country and in turn caused agencies varied levels of problems in clearing their respective consignments, some not being able to clear them at all. After consultation amongst UN agencies it was determined that although standard procedures had been slightly modified, it was still possible to free consignments, namely by ensuring a greater presence at the customs sights, to ensure consignments were being processed. Therefore, during the strike, the following procedures should be adhered to, in order to ensure speedy process:
- Receive clearance by Haiti Director General - Customs (standard procedure)
- Receive clearance by Port-au-Prince port or airport Director - Customs (standard procedure), and
- Have the documentation processed by Customs Emergency Cell - located at the port and airport for final clearance (exceptional procedure)
It must be emphasized agencies are highly encouraged to have one of their agency representatives following up clearance of consignments throughout the whole process. The use of Brokers, alone, may prove unsuccessful as they often will not have the clout, during a strike, to have customs agents process the consignments. Agency representatives may at time have to remind the customs emergency cell of their obligations and emphasize the fact most UN/IGO/NGO consignments are humanitarian relief goods. Another successful approach was the establishment by some agencies of a letter to the DG Customs, which permitted release of consignments by anticipation.
In the event aforementioned procedures are ineffective, the office of the Director General - Customs may be contacted at +509 299-1763/60 or +509 222-0661.
4. Emergency Stocks
5. Air Operations
Haiti Helicopter Landing Zone and Airfield Map:
Based on information provided by CHC Helicopters, through MINUSTAH and data on internationally recognized airports in Haiti, UNJLC Rome has produced a Helicopter Landing Zone and Airfield map for Haiti.
Large format paper copies of the subject map will be available at UNJLC offices during the week of 02 August 2004. High and Low resolution electronic versions are currently available at:
http://www.unjlc.org/content/index.phtml/itemId/19344
Maps appearing on UNJLC websites can be ordered through the UNJLC Haiti office.
6. Infrastructure
Haiti Ports Network:
The two main international ports, or ports officially opened to external trade, in Haiti are the ports of Port-au-Prince and that of Cap-Haïtien.
Seventeen coastal traffic ports of which eight receive international traffic: Fort Liberté*, Port-de-Paix*, Gonaïves*, Saint-Marc*, Carriès, Anse-à-Galets. Cité Soleil (non-operational), La Saline, Petit-Goâve*. Miragoâne*, Baradères (non-operational), Jérémie, Anse-d'Hainault, Corail, Port-à-Piment, Cayes*, and Jacmel*.
(* = Coastal traffic ports with international traffic).
The main part of these installations were built or re-habilitated during the 1970 - 1984 period.
Both ports Port-au-Prince and Cap Haïtien ports have considerable problems. The Port de Port-au-Prince is affected by a number of problems, namely:
- degradation of structures
- berths have no protection, making docking dangerous for structures
- average handling equipment (20 years old) is obsolete, less and less used, are insufficient in numbers, mainly out of order or only partly operational. The private sector, therefore, normally use their own equipment for handling of containers
- the 150 T P&H crane is out of order and the railed crane, with a reach of 25.6m, is used at no more than half it's capacity as it cannot accommodate the PANAMAX ships whose width is 32.25m
- the need for important dredging works - the access way and berths, initially having 10m depths, require expensive dredging due to sanding which has reduced this depth to 8 and 9 m.
- the marking of the port has been inexistent for several years, compromising maritime navigation safety, and
- ship water re-supply is made through the use of tanker trucks as the port does not have dedicated water tanks
See Ports
The Port du Cap-Haïtien, with a dual vocation of cruise ship and merchandise port, holds generally modern infrastructures which are in good condition. It, however, is not equipped with handling equipment, its warehouses are in poor condition and it has a non-operational water tank.
The National Port Authority (APN - Autorité Portuaire Nationale) is a commercially motivated independent body placed under tutorship of the Ministry of Economy and Finance, whose essential mission is to provide port services to ships and users of Haiti ports. It, namely, has the mandate to: develop, maintain, operate, manage the country public port facilities and improve the performances and economic return, establish the tariffs, rates, laws and rules of all ports, promote, develop and administer the "Free Zone".
Considering their advanced state of degradation and their inadequacy to greet unsolicited international traffic, the coastal traffic port installations require considerable rehabilitation works. Three of them appear on the government rehabilitation program, through the central management unit: Port-de-Paix severely damaged by a ship in 1987 during meteorological perturbations. Gonaïves et Saint-Marc.
The APN provides no services nor warehousing at those ports, which have no handling equipments and in most cases have no water, electricity nor telephone.
The Port of Port-au-Prince has public installations (or main wharf) exploited by the APN and those commonly called private wharfs, numbering 5 located in a 30 km radius from the main wharf and which receives a vast majority of bulk and petroleum products.
- with 8 - 10m water depth, the public installations provide 1250m of berths, 2 RO/RO (Roll-on / Roll-off) berths and 500m of cruise ship berths.
- until recently, through the port of Port-au-Prince, has transited more than 90% of all goods imported or exported. Private berths represented approximately 52% of tonnage activity recorded. Containerised traffic, most of which transits by the main wharf, on average represented 53% of the main Wharf. Imports represented in tonnage, 96% of traffic.
The port of Cap-Haïtien, does not receive such intense traffic as that of Port-au-Prince and has mainly received conventional (69%) and cruise ships (24%), as well as RO/RO, cement transporters and yachts. Containerised traffic represented no more than 4 - 5% of total tonnage.
Coastal traffic has contributed to internal transport of goods and passengers, of which 50% were from, or destined, to Port-au-Prince.
Higher resolution maps of both the ports of Port-au-Prince and Cap-Haïtien will be shortly be available at http://www.unjlc.org/content/index.phtml/itemId/19272
7. Civil-Military Coordination
Following the official transition which took place between the MIF - Multi-National Interim Force and the MINUSTAH military forces, at the end of June 2004, the majority of MINUSTAH military component are expected to be deployed, in Haiti, by mid-August 2004. The military component of the mission, which is lead by Brazil, will also include contingents from Argentina, Chile, Nepal, Paraguay and Peru. Discussions are currently under way to, perhaps, increase the mission engineer component from a strength of 1 x Engineer Troop to that of a Squadron/Company; an asset which could prove useful in improving access to areas requiring relief assistance, following a natural disaster.
The primary access point for use of MINUSTAH military assets is done through the MINUSTAH U-9 cell, also known as CIMIC - Civil-Military Cooperation.
See CMCOORD
Individuals not familiar with military alpha-numeric designators (i.e. U-9) simply need to know that military forces normally use S, G and J alpha denominators to refer as S: Staff, G: General and J: Joint. "S" is normally used at Battalion level, "G" at Brigade and Division level and "J" at Division and higher levels, when a mix of land/air/sea forces work together. The designator "U" is used by military forces operating at national level United Nations Headquarters. UN Forces in the field will use "G" designators.
The numeric designators 1-9 refer to coordination functions found at headquarter levels, and respectively reflect; 1: Personnel, 2: Military Intelligence/Information, 3: Operations, 4: Logistics, 5: Public Information 6: Information Technology and Communications, 7: Non-existent, 8: Non-existent, 9: CIMIC - Civil-Military Cooperation or CMCoord - Civil-Military Coordination. The "6" designator is not used on UN missions as Communications and Information Technology fall under the "4: Logistics" designator.
In order to use MINUSTAH military assets UN agencies, IGO/NGOs should submit their requests to the MINUSTAH U-9 cell. UN Agencies are, however, encouraged to submit subject request through OCHA or UNJLC. UN military forces will, however, also have G-5 CIMIC cells in the field, with which agencies can establish contact. A detailed listing of points of contacts will be provided through this forum, after forces will have successfully deployed throughout Haiti, by mid-Aug.
The U-9 structure holds a disaster response component called "Disaster Response Unit (DRU)". The DRU is non-standing, multi-national mix of national civil and military elements (qualified personnel of rescue, medical and other units; equipment and materials; assets and transport), able to act with other international organizations in disaster response. Composition and the size of the DRU will be determined by the requirements based on an assessment of each particular disaster. A national element of the DRU is a national disaster response capability, for which a TCC has indicated in advance the potential availability as well as the conditions for their use.
As OCHA retains the primary role in coordinating international disaster relief, and the DRU in accordance with the policy document in cooperation with the UN, the proposed procedures for the MINUSTAH CIMIC - CMCOORD also build on the "Oslo Guidelines", prepared by the UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), formerly known as the Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA), which contain general principles for the utilization of Military and Civil Defence Assets (MCDA) in disaster relief situations.
In order to facilitate coordination with MINUSTAH military elements, the Humanitarian Coordinator, in Haiti, can rely on two CMCoord - Civil-Military Coordination Officers; 1 x General CMCoord provided by OCHA/MCDU and 1 x Logistics CMCoord provided by the UNJLC. General CMCoord will liaise with MINUSTAH military for all matters not relating to logistics (i.e. Security, relationships with rebel forces etc), whereas Logistics CMCoord will address the use of MINUSTAH assets (i.e. Air/Land transport, engineers, medical, supply etc). In the absence of one CMCoord officer the other could, at the request of the Humanitarian Coordinator, be called upon to assist in executing the task of the other.
MINUSTAH U-9 Points of Contact and CMCoord Officers in direct support to the Humanitarian Coordinator:
U-9 - Colonel Julio Bordon Tel: +509 244 9361 ext 2094 or +509 558 8082, Email: military-u9-staff@un.org
U-9 - Lieutenant-Colonel Tulio Martini Tel: +509 244 9361 ext. 2094, Email: comandotulio@hotmail.com
U-9 - Major Gustavo Teran Tel : + 509 403 4893, Email : terangustavo@hotmail.com
OCHA - Eric Mouillefarine Tel: + 509 525 5282, Email: mouillefarine@un.org (General CMCoord)
UNJLC - François Desruisseaux Tel: + 509 550 0142, Email: Francois.Desruisseaux@wfp.org (Logistics CMCoord)
8. Logistics Coordination
While there are no emergencies, logistics coordination is essentially conducted through bi-lateral (i.e. phone, e-mail) exchanges of information with agency emergency and logistics coordinators. On a need to be basis, joint inter-agency disaster management - logistics meetings are called and jointly chaired by UNDP Disaster Managements and UNJLC and are also normally attended by OCHA.
During the 20 - 22 July 2004 Tropical depression threat, UNDP Disaster Management, OCHA and UNJLC jointly coordinated inter-agency response planning and preparations, in collaboration with MINUSTAH U-9, PAHO-WHO, UNICEF and WFP. Also in attendance were the International and National elements of IFRC, USAID and MSF. UNDP Disaster Management also kept Haiti Civil Defence abreast of the UN System response capability and liaised with the Haiti National Meteorological Centre. OCHA maintained contact with NGOs, Embassies and Donors. UNJLC confirmed UN agency emergency stocks levels and transport capabilities.
On 22 July 2004, OCHA, UNJLC, MINUSTAH U-9 and MINUSTAH Integrated Service Support representatives validated MINUSTAH assets request procedures, in order to further streamline future disaster response mechanisms.
9. Haiti Coordinates
Francois Desruisseaux, Chief UNJLC Haiti Tel: +509 550 0142, Email: Francois.Desruisseaux@wfp.org
UNJLC Office is located on the ground floor of the WFP building.
UNJLC:
387, avenue John Brown
Bourdon
Port-au-Prince
Haiti
ABOUT UNJLC
UNJLC is an inter-agency facility reporting, in the current emergency, to the Humanitarian Coordinator for Haiti, and overall to the Inter-Agency Standing Committee. Its mandate is to coordinate and optimise the logistics capabilities of Humanitarian organisations in large-scale emergencies. UNJLC operates under the custodianship of WFP who are responsible for the administrative and financial management of the Centre. UNJLC is funded from voluntary contributions channelled through WFP. The UNJLC project document for Haiti can be viewed on the UNJLC website (www.unjlc.org).