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LBR - Port Security at Monrovia - Compliance with International law

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All sea ports, including Monrovia, and ships are required by International Law to meet new security standards from 1 July 2004.

Port Security at Monrovia

Compliance with International law

International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code

Summary

1. All sea ports, including Monrovia, and ships are required by International Law to meet new security standards from 1 July 2004. Failure to do so may mean that some ships will refuse to enter the port and others will only do so for an increased fee. There may be short-term implications for the UN because of possible delays in cargo deliveries, the most serious being the possibility of fuel and food cargoes being cancelled or delayed. There are long-term implications for Liberia if the port becomes less attractive to shippers and more expensive for users.

Background

2. A conference of Contacting Governments to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 1974 (SOLAS), which includes Liberia, was held in London in December 2002. The Conference added a new Chapter XI-2 dealing with special measures to enhance maritime security. That Chapter was supplemented by the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code which contains security requirements for ships and ports that must be implemented by 1 July 2004. The purpose of the code is to provide a standardised, consistent framework for evaluating risks and enabling Governments to offset changes in threats with changes in vulnerability. Further details are shown in Annex A below.

3. The Liberian Government, which as at 7 May 2004 had not formally ratified the new Chapter, has asked the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) to conduct a national seminar in Monrovia 24 – 28 May 2004 “to familiarize the participants with the concepts and principles of maritime and port security as given in SOLAS Chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code and ensure their understanding of the methods of conducting a port facility security assessment and a ship security assessment”. The UNJLC Team has been invited to that Seminar as Observers

4. UN Civil Affairs is addressing the legal aspects with the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Bureau of Maritime Affairs. UNJLC Planning Team is concerned with the logistics aspects and will monitor progress in case there are likely to be delays to shipping.

Discussion

5. It is apparent that the GOL is ill prepared to comply with the ISPS and will need considerable foreign assistance to do so. The consequences after 1 July could range from ship owners refusing to allow their ships to enter the ports anywhere in Liberia to an increase in cargo costs to cover insurance and inspection charges at subsequent ports

6. Separate from the security requirements, the Port needs to be almost completely refurbished and the channel dredged. A Needs Analysis was completed in Nov 03 but there has been little progress since then. Any refurbishing will have to include the recommendations of any ISPS survey.

7. The issue is a national security and legal matter and will continue to be handled primarily by Civil Affairs. There are no immediate effects on Humanitarian Operations although it would be prudent for Agencies using ships to have as much cargo as possible delivered before 1 July. In the medium term, the matter has the potential to disrupt UN activities or even severely limit them, with fuel being notably vulnerable. It is too early to detect the reaction from shipping companies to Monrovian non-compliance.

Annex A to Briefing Notes on ISPS

International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code

1. When a threat increases, the logical response is to reduce vulnerability. Essentially, the Code treats ship and port facility security as a risk management activity. To start the process, each Government must conduct a port facility assessment with three components:

  1. Evaluate the assets and infrastructure that are critical to the port’s operation.
  2. Identify the threats to those assets and infrastructure.
  3. Identify the vulnerability by identifying weaknesses in physical security, transport infrastructure, protection systems, procedures, communications and utilities

3. With the above information, the Government can evaluate the risk. The Port will then be required to produce:

  1. Port Facility Security Plans.
  2. Port Facility Security Officers.
  3. The necessary Security equipment.

4. Finally, to link the Port system in with ships and cargoes, there is a requirement to

  1. Monitor and control access.
  2. Monitor and control the activities of people and cargo.
  3. Maintain security communication between ships and the port.
 
 

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